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Abstract
We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE)
protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum com-
puter, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure
against a quantum adversary with several ion-trap quantum computers. We
present a password encrypted no-key protocol to resist middle-man attack,
and prove that it is also with the post-quantum security. The analysis pre-
sented here is probably of general meaning for the security evaluation of
various hybrid cryptosystems.
Keywords: Encrypted key exchange, post-quantum security, physical
security of protocol
The development of quantum computer is threatening modern cryptog-
raphy, especially the public-key cryptosystems. The post-quantum security
of cryptographic protocols becomes of general interest. Since there is no ef-
ficient quantum attack so far to the cryptographic algorithms based on hard
problems of the lattice, coding and multivariate objects, many researchers
turning their interest to related cryptography and cryptanalysis problem.
Here we consider to resist this threat along another line: since a quantum
computer is a physical system, its gate operation rate is limited by some basic
physics parameters, thus some kinds of cryptographic algorithms may keep
their security against a quantum adversary. We shall explain this through
analyzing several examples in details.
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1. The basic idea
The encrypted key exchange (EKE) protocol integrates the asymmetric
and symmetric encryption algorithms to ensure two parties sharing a secret
key[1]. We first evaluate the post-quantum security of the EKE protocols via
analyzing a simplified EKE protocol. Suppose two participants A(Alice) and
B(Bob) preshare a password P , they intend to establish a secret key K via
EKE protocol. A simplified EKE protocol is as follows[2]:
Let EP (·)/DP (·) be the encryption/decryption algorithms using password
P as its key, the public domain parameters are group (G, ·), and α ∈ G with
order n.
1. A randomly chooses µA(0 < µA 6 n− 1), and computes
νA = α
µA , yA = EP (νA), (1)
then she sends ID(A) and yA to B.
2. B randomly chooses µB(0 < µB 6 n− 1), and computes
νB = α
µB , yB = EP (νB), (2)
then she sends ID(B) and yB to A.
3. A computes
νB = DP (yB), K = (νB)
µA = αµB ·µA (3)
and B computes
νA = DP (yA), K = (µA)
νB = αµA·µB . (4)
Finally, A and B establish a key string K with EKE protocol.
For an EKE protocol, the attacker(Eve) can get all the ciphertexts trans-
mitted in the channel. As the password P is not available to Eve, she cannot
impersonate B to interact with A and get the session key K. In order to get
K, Eve has to perform a password-guessing attack as follows:
She generates a candidate password P ′ to decrypt EP (νA), EP (νB), and
obtains
µA
′ = logα(α
µA)′, K ′ = (ν ′B)
µA
′
, (5)
or
µB
′ = logα(α
µB)′, K ′ = (ν ′A)
µB
′
. (6)
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During this stage, Eve cannot check whether her candidate session key
K ′ is correct. She can only assess a K ′ is correct by checking a decrypted
plaintext is meaningful.
Suppose Eve has a quantum computer. For each candidate P ′, Eve has to
execute the discrete logarithm computation once. Let ∆T1 be a lower bound
of time cost by a cycle of the discrete logarithm computation, and the time
to perform an elementary quantum logic operation is ∆t1. It is well known
that ∆t1 has a lower bound:
∆t1 > 10−14, (7)
then the time of a discrete logarithm computing cycle ∆T1 will be
∆T1 = N1 ·∆t1, (8)
where N1 is the number of quantum gate executed serially in a discrete
logarithm algorithm. It can be seen that the value of N1 depends on the
improvement of paralization of quantum discrete logarithm algorithm. Al-
though we cannot calculate the exact value of N1, a rough estimation for a
lower bound of N1 is easy, then we have
∆T1 > 104 ·∆t1 > 104 · 10−14 = 10−10, (9)
that is, the cycle of a discrete logarithm computation is no less than 10−10
seconds.
The physical security of a protocol[4] indicates that the protocol will never
be broken by an adversary living in the real physical world. Let N be the ulti-
mate number of times a quantum computer can finish the discrete logarithm
algorithm during 100 years, we have
N <
232
10−10
< 266. (10)
For each candidate P ′, Eve has to execute the quantum algorithm of discrete
logarithm at least once to get µ′A or µ
′
B, so the length of the password P
should satisfy x > 66, that is, for resisting attack with several(21) quantum
computers, a 68-bit password is enough to ensure the security of an EKE
protocol within 100 years.
Above analysis is based on some universal parameters of single-qubit
quantum gate operations. Now we focus on the analysis of CNOT gate
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of ion-trap quantum computers. Ion-trap quantum computer is proposed by
Cirac and Zoller in 1995[5], it is considered one of the most promising scheme
of physical implementation of quantum computer. To compute a discrete
logarithm meaningful in cryptanalysis, the quantum computer must at least
have n ∼ 210 − 214 qubits. In an ion-trap quantum computer, the distance
between two neighboring qubits is a ∼ 10 µm, and the characteristic distance
of two qubits executing the CNOT operation is about 102 a. In an ion-trap,
the mutual Coulomb force between two ions is
(n0e)
2
4piε0 · r2 , (11)
where n0 denotes the number of the electrons in an ion, and r denotes the
distance between the two ions. In the ion-trap quantum computer, the force
to an ion can be expressed as
F = −K · x, (12)
K =
4(n0e)
2
4piε0
(
1
13
+
1
23
+ · · · ) 1
a3
=
4(n0e)
2
4piε0
ζ(3) · 1
a3
, (13)
where ζ(·) denotes the Riemann zeta-function, ζ(3) ≈ 1.2, so
K =
4.8(n0e)
2
4piε0
· 1
a3
. (14)
It is proper to reckon the propagation velocity of interaction between different
qubits carried by photons via evaluating the velocity of the acoustic waves
in the trap based partially on some parameters of the stationary wave. For
the ion-trap, the dispersion relation of the acoustic waves is
2piν = 2
√
K
m
sin
pia
λ
, (15)
where ν, λ are the frequency and the wavelength of the acoustic wave, respec-
tively, and m is the mass of every ion. As λ  a, equivalent to monochro-
matic approximation, the dispersion relation can be simplified as
2piν ≈ 2
√
K
m
pia
λ
, (16)
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then we obtain the velocity of the acoustic waves:
v = λ · ν =
√
K
m
· a =
√
1.2(n0e)2
piε0am
. (17)
Let n0 = 1, the velocity will be
v =
√
1.2e2
piε0am
= 0.32× 102 m/s, (18)
so the time a CNOT operation takes will be greater than
∆t2 ≈ 2.85× 10−4. (19)
In a discrete logarithm computation considered, the number of CNOT opera-
tions executed serially is N2 ∼ O(logn)[9]. In view of the fault-tolerant struc-
ture of the ion-trap quantum computer,especially the concatenated quantum
error-correcting coding related with threshold theorem, we know that
N2 > 10
2, (20)
then we can infer that the lower bound of time finishing a discrete logarithm
computation is
∆T2 = N2 ·∆t2 > 2.85× 10−4 × 102 = 2.85× 10−2. (21)
That is, during one second, an ion-trap quantum computer cannot finish the
discrete logarithm computation 26 times, then the attacker cannot execute
the discrete logarithm computation 238 times in 100 years(≈ 232 seconds).
Therefore, in 100 years, an EKE protocol with a 40-bit password can resist the
attacker with several(21) ion-trap quantum computers. Although physical
parameters of other kinds of quantum computers are different from that of
the ion-trap quantum computer, the conclusion is similar.
Let us estimate the length of a password that ensures the physical security
of the EKE protocol. Suppose the size of a quantum computer is about one
meter, then the upper bound of number of the quantum computers employing
by any adversary is
4pi × (6370× 103)2 = 5.1× 1014 < 249. (22)
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With all these quantum computers the attacker can run the discrete loga-
rithm algorithm about 249+38 = 287 times within 100 years. When the length
of the password P is 88, the attacker has to call the algorithm for averagely
287 times, this is beyond the attacker’s maximal calculating ability. 88 is
roughly the number of bits of 11 characters of ASCII, which is an usual
option of a password in nowadays internet. Our conclusion is: the attacker
cannot break EKE protocol during 100 years even if he owns a huge number
of ion-trap quantum computers, an 88-bit password is enough to achieve the
physical security of a EKE protocol.
2. Post-quantum security of several EKE protocols
The EKE schemes use both symmetric and public key encryption algo-
rithm to provide secrecy and entity authentication for the users of network[10].
By executing an EKE protocol, two participants A(Alice) and B(Bob) can
identify each other and generate a common key K.
2.1. The EKE protocol
The EKE protocol is as follows:
1. A randomly generates the public key/secret key pair, eA and dA. Then
he uses the password P to encrypt eA by symmetric encryption and sends to
B
A,EP (eA).
2. As B is aware of the password P , he decrypts EP (eA) to extract eA.
Afterwards, B randomly generates a session key K, and encrypts it with the
public key eA and the password P respectively by asymmetric and symmetric
encryption, then sends to A
EP (EeA(K)).
3. After receiving EP (EeA(K)), A uses the password P and the secret key
dA to extract K, then generates a random string RA and uses K to encrypt
it, then she sends to B
EK(RA).
4. B extracts RA with K, then generates another random string RB, and
sends to A
EK(RA, RB).
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5. A decrypts EK(RA, RB) and gets (RA, RB), then she checks whether
RA is correct. If the check succeeds, A sends to B
EK(RB).
6. B decrypts EK(RB) to get RB, then he checks whether RB is correct.
If the check pass, the protocol is accomplished, and A and B can use K as
the session key for communication.
An EKE protocol can be achieved with various public key algorithm. The
one based on Diffie-Hellman protocol can be described as follows(the public
domain parameters are group (G, ·) and g ∈ G with order q which are public
to all the users):
1. A randomly chooses a random string rA and sends to B
A, grA (mod q), (23)
2. B randomly chooses a random string rB and computes: K = g
rA·rB .
He randomly chooses a string RB, then computes and sends to A
EP (g
rB(mod q)), EK(RB). (24)
3. A decrypts EP (g
rB(mod q)) to get grB(mod q), further she computes
K and uses it to extract RB by decrypting EK(RB) with K. She generates
another random string RA, and sends to B
EK(RA, RB). (25)
4. B decrypts EK(RA, RB) to get RA and RB. Once he ensures that the
string RB is correct, he sends to A
EK(RA). (26)
5. A decrypts EK(RA) to get RA. Once she ensures that the string RA
is correct, the protocol is completed. Now the two parties can use K as the
session key for communication.
In this Diffie-Hellman-based EKE protocol, the attacker can get all the ci-
phertexts transmitted in the channel: grA(mod q), EP (g
rB(mod q)), EK(RB),
EK(RA), and EK(RA, RB). After generating a candidate password P
′, Eve
can computes
r′B = logg[DP ′(EP (g
rB(mod q)))], (27)
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and further computes a candidate session key
K ′ = grA·r
′
B . (28)
In order to avoid the attacker’s achieving grA(mod q) directly, A can send
the encrypted string EP (g
rA(mod q)) to B. Then, the ciphertexts Eve ob-
tains turn to be EP (g
rA(mod q)), EP (g
rB(mod q)), EK(RB), EK(RA) and
EK(RA, RB). After generating a candidate password P
′, Eve can computes
a candidate key K ′ as
r′B = logg[DP ′(EP (g
rB(mod q)))], K ′ = (DP ′(EP (grA(mod q))))r
′
B (29)
or
r′A = logg[DP ′(EP (g
rA(mod q)))], K ′ = (DP ′(EP (grB(mod q))))r
′
A . (30)
After getting K ′, Eve can use it to decrypt EK(RB), EK(RA), EK(RA, RB)
and obtains
R′A = DK′(EK(RA)), R
′
B = DK′(EK(RA)), (31)
(R′′A, R
′′
B) = DK′(EK(RA, RB)) (32)
then verifies K ′ by checking whether (R′A, R
′
B) is equal to (R
′′
A, R
′′
B).
We can see that, in this Diffie-Hellman-based EKE protocol the entity
authentication can help Eve to check whether her candidate key is correct,
at the same time, it will not reduce the number of of times executing the
discrete logarithm computation. In this EKE protocol, for each candidate
password P ′, the attacker has to execute the discrete logarithm computation
once, no matter whether grA is encrypted with the password P . Therefore,
a 40-bit password is enough to resist an attacker with several(21) quantum
computers for 100 years, and an 88-bit password is enough to achieve a
physical security of this protocol.
2.2. The enhanced EKE protocol
In the Diffie-Hellman-based EKE protocol, the attacker Eve an get all
the ciphertexts transmitted in the channel: grA(mod q), EP (g
rB(mod q)),
EK(RB), EK(RA) and EK(RA, RB). Once Eve recovers some old session
keys, she may use these messages to launch some attacks about the password
P . An enhanced EKE protocol[11,12] can efficiently forbid the attacker from
using the old session key K to get any information about the password P .
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In the enhanced EKE protocol, the string K = grA·rB is used for key
exchange. We denote the final session key as S in step 2 of the Diffie-
Hellman-based EKE protocol, B generates another random string SB and
sends to A
EP (g
rB(mod q)), EK(RB, SB), (33)
then, in step 3, A generates another random string SA and sends to B
EK(RA, RB, SA). (34)
Finally, both A and B can get the session key S = SA⊕SB. This key can be
used to encrypt messages between A and B, and K is just used for encrypting
random strings.
We can see that in this enhanced EKE protocol, the attacker Eve cannot
directly get any information about the password P from the session key S
because P is not directly used to encrypt any string that can be used directly
to derive S. In order to identify the password P , Eve should get the correct
encryption key K at first. Suppose Eve has already got an old session key
S, he generate a candidate key K ′ to computes
(R′A, R
′
B, S
′
A) = DK′EK(RA, RB, SA), (35)
(R′B, S
′
B) = DK′EK(RB, SB), (36)
S ′ = S ′A ⊕ S ′B, (37)
then checks whether K ′ is correct by checking whether S ′ is equal to S. After
getting the correct K, she generates a candidate password P ′, then computes
r′B = logg[DP ′EP (g
rB(mod q))], K ′ = grA·r
′
B , (38)
now Eve can check whether P ′ is correct by checking whether K ′ is equal to
K.
Compared with the simple Diffie-Hellman-based EKE protocol, in this
enhanced EKE protocol, the security of the password P will not only de-
pends on the length of the password P , but also depends on the length of
the key K, and K can be much longer than P . While K is large enough, Eve
cannot use the old session key S to extract information about the password
P . In addition, in this protocol the attacker also has to execute the discrete
logarithm computation at least once for each candidate P ′, so the calculated
amount of the attacker is not reduced, the physical security of the proto-
col is still ensured, a 40-bits password is long enough to resist the attacker
with several(21) ion-trap quantum computer with 100 years, and an 88-bits
password is long enough to achieve the physical security of the protocol.
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2.3. The A-EKE protocol
The original EKE protocol has a defect: both the two parties A and B
should be aware of the password P in advance. Actually, most of identifica-
tion systems based on password just store the hash value of the password,
rather than the password itself. In an augmented EKE(A-EKE) protocol[13],
the one-way hash value of the password P is used as the super password. A
Diffie-Hellman-based A-EKE protocol is as follows:
1. A computes the one-way hash value of the password P (denoted by p)
and randomly chooses a random string RA, then she sends to B
Ep(g
RA mod q). (39)
2. B chooses a random string RB, and sends to A
Ep(g
RB mod q). (40)
3. Both A and B compute the session key
K = gRA×RB . (41)
In order to confirm that she really owns the password P , A sends to B
EK(SP (K)). (42)
As B is aware of the strings K and p, he can easily decrypt EK(SP (K))
and verify the signature. Only the one who has the password P and the
session key K can generate the cipher EK(SP (K)). As analyzed in the simple
EKE protocol in Sec.1, the attacker also has to run the discrete logarithm
algorithm once for each candidate p′ in the A-EKE protocol, so the physical
security of this protocol is ensured by an 88-bit password. It can be seen
that the attacker cannot get any information about the password P .
3. Post-quantum security of encrypted no-key protocol
3.1. Shamir’s no-key protocol
In addition to the EKE protocol, other hybrid cryptosystems are of in-
terest for post-quantum cryptography, such as Shamir’s no-key protocol.
Shamir’s no-key protocol can be regarded as a kind of key generation protocol[14].
In this protocol, two participants A and B exchange three messages through
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a public channel without authentication to transmit a secret key. The basic
no-key protocol is as follows(a prime number q is a public parameter that
chosen in advance):
1. A randomly chooses a key string K and a secret number a, then she
computes a−1 (mod q − 1) and sends to B
Ka mod q (43)
2. B randomly chooses a secret number b and computes b−1 (mod q− 1),
and sends to A
(Ka)b mod q (44)
3. A computes
Kb(mod q) = ((Ka)b)(a
−1mod q−1)mod q (45)
and sends it to B.
4. B recovers the secret key K via computing
K = (Kb)(b
−1 mod q−1) mod q. (46)
Then, A transmits the secret key K to B successfully.
It can be seen that the basic no-key protocol cannot resist the middle-man
attack. The attacker Eve can get K as follows:
Firstly, Eve impersonates B to interact with A:
1.A→ Eve : Ka mod q,
2.A← Eve : Kae mod q,
3.A→ Eve : Ke mod q.
Then, Eve computes the secret key K and personates A to interact with B:
1.Eve→ B : Ke mod q,
2.Eve← B : Keb mod q,
3.Eve→ B : Kb mod q.
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3.2. The encrypted no-key protocol
In order to resist the middle-man attack, we use a password shared by A
and B to enhance the no-key protocol.
The protocol is as follows:
1. A randomly generates the secret key K and a random number a, and
computes Ka mod q, then uses the password P to encrypt it by a given
symmetric encryption algorithm and sends to B
EP (K
a mod q). (47)
2. B decrypts EP (K
a mod q) and then randomly generates a string b. He
computes Kab mod q, and encrypts it with the password P , and then sends
to A
EP (K
ab mod q). (48)
3. After receiving EP (K
ab mod q), A uses the password P to extract
Kab mod q, then she computes
Kb(mod q) = (Kab)a
−1
mod q, (49)
and sends to B
EP (K
b mod q). (50)
4. B decrypts EP (K
b mod q) to get the secret key K,
K = DP (EP (K
b mod q))b
−1
mod q. (51)
For this encrypted no-key protocol, Eve can get all the ciphertexts trans-
mitted in the channel: EP (K
a mod q), EP (K
ab mod q), EP (K
b mod q). As
password P is not available, Eve cannot get K via impersonating B to inter-
act with A. In order to obtain K, she has to perform a password-guessing
attack as follows:
Eve randomly generates a candidate password P ′, then uses it to decrypt
EP (K
a mod q), EP (K
ab mod q) and EP (K
b mod q), and obtains (Ka)′,
(Kb)′ and (Kab)′. Then, she try to extract a′ from [(Kb)′, (Kab)′], and b′
from [(Ka)′, (Kab)′]. Finally, she computes
K ′ = ((Ka)′)(a
′)−1 , (52)
K ′′ = ((Kb)′)(b
′)−1 , (53)
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and verifies whether the candidate password P ′ is correct by checking whether
K ′ is equal to K ′′. It is obvious that the computational complexity of this
attack depends on the length of password P .
For each candidate P ′, Eve has to execute the discrete logarithm com-
putation twice. As analyzed in Sec.1, in order to resist an attacker with an
ion-trap quantum computer, the length x of the password P should satisfy:
2x > 238/2 = 237, (54)
thus, for an attacker with several(22) ion-trap quantum computers, a 40-bit
password is enough to ensure the physical security of the protocol within 100
years. Account of the attacker’s maximal ability of computing in physics, an
88-bit password is enough.
The hybrid cryptosystems integrating both asymmetric and symmetric
algorithms have already been a common choice in the practice of cryptog-
raphy. The problem is to evaluate their security in quantum computing
environment, and to choose appropriate parameters in accordance with their
security requirements. For the developing of post-quantum cryptography,
this is in fact one of the most direct and effective option.
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